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COMMENT
Administration of Reserved
and Non-Reserved Water Rights
on an Indian Reservation:
Post-Adjudication Questions
on the Big Horn River
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the beginning, tells the Arapaho creation myth, the earth was
covered by the waters of a flood. On the protruding peak of a high mountain sat the first Arapaho, weeping because he was lonely and homeless.
The Creator came to him and commanded a dove to go in search of a home
for the Arapaho. The dove searched but found only water over the whole
world. Finally, a turtle dived once into the water and surfaced with a
mouthful of mud, reporting that the earth was under the water. The Cre"
ator then said, "Let the waters flow away ....
The waters of the Big Horn River in Wyoming have been the subject of an ongoing battle-first over adjudication, then over administration
of the respective water rights of all users of the river system. Wyoming
courts have been able to adjudicate the rights in the Big Horn and its tributaries (in terms of quantity and priority date) among various claimants,
including the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes. In 1988 the Wyoming
Supreme Court approved the first state adjudication of Indian reserved
water rights in the United States with the decision in In Re Rights To Use Of
Water In Big Horn River.2 The most recent litigation, however, does not
focus on the adjudication of water rights. Instead, it centers on the apportionment of power. Who will have the authority to administer the rights
recognized?
The Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes occupy the Wind River Indian
Reservation in west central Wyoming. The Big Horn River cuts across the
1. W. Ziegler & M. Capron, Wyoming Indians 61 (1944). See also V. Trenholm, The Arapahos, Our People 3 (1970).

2. 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff 'd mem. sub nom., Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406

(1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989) [hereinafter Big Horn I ].
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eastern edge of the reservation and forms the spine of a watershed that
drains much of western Wyoming, eventually flowing north into Montana
and the Missouri River drainage. The Reservation takes its name from a
tributary to the Big Horn that rises in the Wind River Range and flows east
across the Reservation, turning north at Riverton, Wyoming to eventually
become the Big Horn.
The water rights held by the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes are
protected by the federal government from appropriation under the mechanisms of state water law. These rights were reserved for the Tribes when
Congress created the Reservation in 1868. 3 Yet, the adjudication and
administration of water rights-at least when they do not involve disputes between states-traditionally has been left to state courts and agencies, in Wyoming and throughout the West. Herein lies the heart of the
conflict between federal protection and state regulation. This conflict has
pitted the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes against the state engineer of
Wyoming in a dispute over interpretation and administration of a 1985
decree.
The McCarran Amendment 4 functions as a key by which state
adjudicative processes can gain access to protected federal water rights.
This access takes the form of jurisdiction-a jurisdiction that is necessary
if the federal rights are to be accommodated within a statewide system of
interrelated water rights. The McCarran Amendment is a waiver of
United States sovereign immunity for the limited purpose of basin-wide
water rights adjudications. 5 But once the rights have been adjudicated,
how, and by whom, is the resulting decree to be monitored and administered? While the McCarran Amendment allows state courts jurisdiction
over reserve rights, there is no parallel provision for state administrative
agencies. The state engineer is thus powerless to enforce the decree
against the Tribes.
The Big Horn dispute has brought two important questions
before the Wyoming Supreme Court: First, may the Tribes use their
reserved water right for instream flow, without regard to Wyoming state
water law? And second, should the Tribal water agency be designated to
replace the state engineer as the authority charged with administration
and control of nonIndian water rights on the Wind River Reservation? The
answer to the first question lies firmly anchored in existing concepts of
federal water law. The answer to the second question is less secure. In
3. The Wind River Indian Reservation was created by the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Eastern Band of Shoshones and the Bannock Tribe of Indians, July 3,1868,
15 Stat. 673 [hereinafter Second Treaty of Fort Bridger].
4. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988). For a discussion of the McCarran Amendment, see infra part VI.
5. "Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States [owns] or is in the process of
acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise ....
" 43 U.S.C. § 666 (a).
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defining the Tribes' reserved right, the Wyoming courts have been able to
turn to a body of federal case law establishing a framework for determining the size and scope of a federally reserved water right.6 However, there
is no comparably definitive authority on the subject of enforcing such a
right on an Indian reservation. This Comment will examine both the
immunity to state law inherent in a federally reserved water right and
some obstacles to the enforcement of such a right on an Indian reservation.
Under the decree issued pursuant to the Big Horn adjudication,
the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes were awarded 500,717 acre-feet per
year 7 as a federal reserved water right with a priority date of 1868. This
quantity was based on a finding that the Wind River Indian Reservation
had been created with a "sole agricultural purpose,"8 and was calculated
using the total practicably irrigable acreage (PIA)9 on the Reservation. It is
thus more water than the Tribes have ever historically used for irrigation.10
In the Spring of 1990 the Tribes enacted an Interim Tribal Water
Code and issued to themselves Instream Flow Permit No. 90-001 under
that code.11 Instream Flow Permit No. 90-001 authorized the dedication of
252 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water in a particular stretch of the Wind
6. See infra part IV, "Federal Reserve Water Rights."
7. Big Horn I affirmed most of the May 1985 Amended Judgment and Decree issued by the
state district court. The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court's 10
percent reduction in quantity awarded. The district court had made the reduction to compensate for an estimated 10 percent margin of error in the calculations. The Supreme Court correctly reasoned that such a margin of error could go either way-i.e., it could as easily result
in an underestimate as an overestimate-and reinstated the 10 percent deleted from the calculations. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 105-106.
8. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 96. In explaining this holding, the Court distinguished agriculture
from other occupations and stated: "Article 7 of the treaty refers to 'said agricultural reservations.' Article 6 authorizes allotments for farming purposes; Article 8 provides seeds and
implements for farmers; in Article 9 'the United States agreed to pay each Indian farming a
$20 annual stipend, but only $10 to "roaming" Indians'; and Article 12 establishes a $50 prize
to the 10 best Indian farmers. The treaty does not encourage any other occupation or pursuit." Id. at 97.
For two critiques of the purpose-of-the-reservation analysis used by the Court in Big Horn
I, see P. Rogers, Note, In Re Rights To Use Water In Big Horn River, 30 Nat. Res. J. 439 (1990);
and D. Stanton, Note, Is There a Reserved Right for Wildlife on the Wind River Indian Reservation?-A CriticalAnalysis of the Big Horn River General Adjudication,35 S.D. L. Rev. 326 (1990).
9. Determining practicably irrigable acreage involves an analysis of the engineering and
economic feasibility of irrigation development on the land area in question. The resulting figure for the number of acres that can be practicably irrigated is then used to determine the
quantity of water reserved for the purpose of irrigation on an Indian reservation when it is
found that such a purpose was intended at the creation of the reservation. See infra notes 6870 and accompanying text for some further discussion of the use and origin of the PIA standard.
10. Any remaining dispute about the quantity of the Tribes' award was settled when an
equally divided United States Supreme Court affirmed the Wyoming court's use of PIA as
the applicable standard for quantifying the Tribes' reserved water rights. Wyoming v. United
States, 492 U.S. 496 (1989)(O'Connor, J. abstaining).
11. The Wind River Interim Water Code was enacted on April 11, 1990. Chapter I of the
Code includes in its list of "beneficial uses" instream flow for "fisheries, wildlife, and pollution control, aesthetic and cultural purposes."
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River for fisheries enhancement and other purposes. 12 In Early May, 1990,
the Tribes' acting tribal water engineer contacted the state engineer seeking enforcement of Permit No. 90-001. Maintaining that the permit
attempted to authorize an impermissible use of water, the state engineer
refused to enforce it and instead sought negotiation with the Tribes.13
On July 30, 1990, the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes filed suit in
Wyoming District Court to compel the state engineer to enforce the Tribes'
water rights against those upstream appropriators holding junior rights
under state law.1 The main issues before the court-appointed special master were whether the Tribes' reserved water right, which had been
awarded based on the PIA standard, could be changed to instream use,
and whether the state engineer should continue as the official charged
with administration and enforcement of the Tribes' reserved water rights.
On October 4, 1990, the special master issued his findings and
concluded that the Tribes were entitled to make any use of their reserved
water right that they deemed advisable. 15 The only restrictions on this
freedom of use are those imposed by federal law: that water use be confined to the boundaries of the reservation, and that consumptive use not
be increased above the quantity reserved.1 6 The special master found that
the use of the PIA standard to quantify the Tribes' water right did not
restrict the application of that water to irrigation. 17 The Tribes were thus
free to dedicate their reserved water right to instream use without regard
to state law. 18 The special master, however, found that it was not appropriate to remove the state engineer of his duty and authority to enforce the
Tribes' federal reserved water rights. 19 On March 11, 1991, the district
12. Report and Recommendation of the Special Master, October 4, 1990, In re: General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water In the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources,
State of Wyoming, Fifth District Court of Wyoming (No. 86-0012)[hereinafter Special Master's Report]. To maintain a minimum flow of 252 cfs, the Tribes dedicated about 80,000 acrefeet/year, or about 16 percent of their total right of 500,717 acre-feet/year, to instream flow.
Sullivan: State Role Needed in Flow Issue, Casper Star-Tribune (Casper, Wyoming), August 1,
1990, at Al, A14.
13. Brief for Appellees Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes at 7, In re: The General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water In the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources,
State of Wyoming, 835 R2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) [hereinafter Brief for Tribes]. See also Brief for
Appellant State of Wyoming at 4-5, [hereinafter Brieffor State].
14. In re: The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water In the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) [hereinafter Big Horn
In Re Big Horn River System ["Big Horn II"], 803 P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990), involved questions
of appellate procedure concerning the rights of nonIndian water right claimants.
15. Special Master's Report, supra note 12, paragraph No. 59.
16. Id. The rationale for limiting the use of the water to the confines of the reservation is
that any exportation of the water off the reservation would contravene the purposes for
which the water was reserved by Congress (i.e., the benefit of the Tribes). For an opposing
view on this issue, see Judge Hanscum's dissent in Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 135.
17. Special Master's Report, supra note 12, paragraph No. 49.
18. Special Master's Report, supra note 12, paragraph No. 60.
19. Special Master's Report, supra note 12, paragraph No. 64.
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court adopted most of the special master's findings but granted the Tribes'
motion that the state engineer be relieved of all further duty to enforce
federal reserved water rights.20 In his stead the court appointed the Tribal
Water Resources Control Board to enforce all rights-both state and federal-within the boundaries of the Reservation.7-"
If the district court's March 1991 Decree is upheld by the Wyoming Supreme Court, Big Horn III will mark an important step in the evolution of Indian water law. It will represent a concrete limit to the
jurisdiction over federal reserve water rights granted to the states under
the McCarran Amendment and developed by subsequent case law.22 If the
Wyoming Supreme Court upholds the district court's replacement of the
state engineer, it will provide a guide for the administration of future
decrees involving Indian and nonIndian water rights on Indian reservations.
II. THE WIND RIVER RESERVATION:
LAND, PEOPLE, AND HISTORY
The Big Horn River drainage basin lies just east of the Continental
Divide and covers much of northwestern and west central Wyoming. The
Big Horn Basin is designated by the State of Wyoming as Water Division
Three, and includes the Wind, Popo Agie, Greybull, Shoshone, and Clark's
Fork Rivers, all of which feed the main stem of the Big Horn. Division
Three extends to the Montana border, where the Big Horn River flows
north out of Wyoming. It encompasses parts of Yellowstone National
Park, the Shoshone and Big Horn National Forests, and other federal entities, including the Wind River Indian Reservation.
The Wind River Reservation covers approximately 4,000 square
miles of some of the "choicest and best-watered" land in Wyoming.2 3 It
stands astride the confluence of the Wind and Popo Agie Rivers, where
they meet to form the Big Horn River in the southern portion of the drainage basin. Elevations range from the 12,500 foot alpine environs of the
Wind River Range in the western portion of the Reservation,
to 4,500 feet
24
in the Wind River Canyon at the northeast corner.
The Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes have each made a long journey
to arrive in the valley of the Wind River. For the Shoshones, the journey
20. Judgment and Decree, March 11, 1991, In re: General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, Fifth District
Court of Wyoming (No. 4993), reprinted in 18 Indian L. Rep. 5073 (April 1991) Ihereinafter
March 1991 Decree].
21. March 1991 Decree, supra note 20, at 18, 18 Indian L. Rptr., supra note 20, at 5076.
22. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
23. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 114 (1938).
24. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 83.
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began in the West, in the Great Basin beyond the Rocky Mountains. For
the Arapahos, the journey began in the East, in the woodlands of the Great
Lakes. For both peoples, it has been an odyssey from the "Bison Path"25 to
the "Corn Road" 2 6 -from the nomadic life of hunters, to a settled life of
metes and bounds, of farming and ranching, of John Deere tractors and
water rights.
The Arapahos believed that Manibus, or "Man-Above" (the
"Manito" common to tribes of Algonquian origin),27 created the Rockies
as a barrier to separate them from their enemies, the Shoshones and the
Utes. 28 For their part, the Shoshones had, by the early nineteenth century,
retreated west of the Continental Divide to seek refuge from the depredations of the Plains tribes including the Arapaho. 29 A mix of historical accident, necessity and government edict has brought the two Tribes together
on the Wind River Reservation.
The terms "Shoshone" and "Snake" appear, often interchangeably, throughout the ethnographic literature of the Rocky Mountain and
Great Basin regions.30 Pre-equestrian Shoshone culture had subsisted on
various forms of hunting, gathering and fishing. 31 When the Eastern Shoshones began, in the 1840s, to venture regularly east of the Wind River
Mountains to hunt buffalo in the Big Horn Basin,32 they carried with them
some of the characteristics of this earlier culture:
[Tihe culture of the Wind River Shoshoni exhibits a
strange conflicting situation. It belongs neither to the
foodgatherers of the west nor to the hunting cultures
of the east-it is something sui generis. To ascribe it to
anyone of its bordering cultures is 33
to lose the dynamic
aspect of the evolution of the tribe.
25. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 4.
26. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 242.
27. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 13.
28. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 33.
29. R. and Y. Murphy, Shoshone-Bannock Subsistence and Society 295 (1960).
30. See generally Murphy, supranote 29, at 296-97 ( a good overview of various attempts at
a taxonomy of Shoshonean groups and sub-groups); J. Steward, Basin-Plateau Aboriginal
Sociopolitical Groups (1938)(a very thorough analysis of the many cultural, political and linguistic variations within the related Shoshone, Bannock and Mono groups).
31. See Steward, supra note 30, At 203. Fish, especially trout, were "of fundamental importance" to the Eastern Shoshone. Murphy, supra note 29, at 308. (See Steward at 40-43 for a
detailed account of the various fish species relied upon by Shoshones west of the Divide.)
This is particularly noteworthy in light of the Big Horn I Court's denial of a reserved water
right for fisheries. Big Horn I at 98. For a critique of the Big Horn I holding that the Wind
River Reservation was created with a sole agricultural purpose, and an assertion that the
Court erred in declining to award a reserved right for wildlife, see D. Stanton, Note, Is There
a Reserved Water Rightfor Wildlife on the Wind River Indian Reservation?-A CriticalAnalysis of
the Big Horn River Adjudication, 35 S.D. L. Rev. 326 (1990).
32. Murphy, supranote 29, at 303.
33. Ake Hultkrantz, Kulturbildningen hos Wyoming's Shoshoni-indianer (1949), quoted
in Murphy, supranote 29, at 294.
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The Eastern or Wind River Shoshone gathered every September to
hunt buffalo on the Wind River.34 It was with this group, under the leadership of Chief Washakie, that a treaty was signed in 1868, promising the
Tribe's "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the land
reserved as the Wind River Indian Reservation.
The "absolute" rights of the Eastern Shoshones to the Wind River
Reservation lasted 10 years. In 1878, with the reluctant consent of Chief
Washakie, their old enemies the Arapahos were moved onto the Reservation.36 Washakie, seeing the poverty and depletion of the Arapahos 37, had
"too great a heart to say no" to their temporary placement on the Reservation until another home could be found for them.38 The Arapahos, however, never left. The permanence of their occupancy was acknowledged by
the United States Supreme Court in 1937, when it upheld an award of
damages to the Shoshone Tribe for a taking of an undivided one-half intersettlement of the Arapaho on land
est in the Reservation, effected by the
39
originally reserved to the Shoshone.
The Arapaho are believed to have moved onto the Plains from the
Red River area of Minnesota. 40 They were one of three Algonquianderived groups on the Plains-the other two being the Blackfeet and the
Cheyenne. 41 The Arapaho were nomadic hunters of big game-buffalo,
deer and elk. The game animals provided42hides for clothing and tipis, as
well as the main part of the Arapaho diet.
By the 1830s the Arapaho had separated into Northern and Southern Bands. The Northern Arapaho, after years of sporadic warfare with
various tribes and the United States Army, were moved onto the Wind
River Reservation in 1878. 43
NonIndian explorers, trappers, and traders began to enter the
region in the early 1800s. Relations with the Shoshone Indians inhabiting
the area were peaceful. In the interest of preservin this peace the United
States entered into the First Treaty of Fort Bridger in 1863, setting aside
over 44 million acres of what is now Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah as
"Shoshonee Country." 45 Only five years later, increasing pressure from
34. Murphy, supra note 29, at 309.
35. Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, supra note 3, art. 5.
36. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 262.
37. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 260.
38. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 262 (quoting former Wyoming Governor John W. Hoyt's
account of his visit to the Wind River Reservation on July 17,1878, in his unpublished autobiography on file at the Wyoming State Archives in Cheyenne).
39. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
40. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 9.
41. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 9.
42. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 65-66.
43. Trenholm, supra note 1, at 262.
44. 18 Stat. 685 (1869).
45. Big Horn 1,753 P.2d at 83.
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46
white settlers after the Civil War led to the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger.
The Second Treaty reduced the land area to approximately three million
acres, and established the Wind River Indian Reservation on July 3, 1868.
A series of land cessions and restorations between 471872 and 1953 have
produced the present boundaries of the Reservation.

III. WYOMING STATE WATER LAW
[T]he federal government has left the creation., defini48
tion, and control of private water rights to the states.
The conflict on the Big Horn River is essentially a fight for control.
It is a conflict between the traditional power of the state to control the allocation of waters within its borders, and the federal power to reserve
waters from such state control. The origins of the Big Horn dispute lie,
then, in the historical vagaries that created such a dual system.
The doctrine of "prior appropriation," as practiced in Wyoming
and most of the Western states, allows the acquisition of private property
interests in the use of water. This doctrine is based on the assumptionborn out of the necessity of delivering water to those locations and activities where it could be beneficially used, regardless of their proximity to
natural streams or lakes-that the right to hold land, and the right to use
the naturally occurring waters on or adjacent to that land, are separate
property interests. This "severance" of the land and water estates was formally acknowledged by Congress with the passage of the Desert Lands
Act in 1877.4 9 The first section of the Act provided that the right to use
water on any land patented to a homesteader under the Act was subject to
prior appropriation under local law. This proviso of the Desert Lands Act
is often cited as the origin of the state power to control water allocation.
Trelease points out, however, that it is probably best viewed as a mere recognition of a power that had long been exercised by the states (and territories) with50the theretofore "silent acquiescence" of the federal
government.
Wyoming law gives the state engineer stringent control over the
award of water rights within the state. This control, however, only applies
to those who must seek their water rights through the state. A reservation
of water rights by the federal government can preempt state control over
the resource. 51 Such is the case on the Big Horn River.
46.
147.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Second Treaty at Fort Bridger, supra note 35.
Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 83-84.
F. Trelease & G. Gould, Water Law 22 (4th ed. 1986).
44th Cong, Sess. II, Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
Trelease & Gould, supranote 48, at 694.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
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IV. FEDERAL RESERVE WATER RIGHTS
The water rights held by the Wind River Tribes are a species
within the broader genus of federal reserve rights. In Winters v. United
States,5 2 in 1908, the Supreme Court first held that an agreement reserving
lands for the purpose of an Indian homeland also reserved water as a necessary appurtenance to the land.53 That holding, however, was merely an
outgrowth of earlier decisions confirming the federal government's power
to reserve property
interests from state control in order to further some
54
federal purpose.
55
Three years before Winters, in the 1905 United States v. Winans
decision, the Court found that an 1859 treaty with the Yakima Indians of
Washington reserved to the Tribe the right to fish at a certain traditional
spot along the Columbia River. This location, however, was outside the
Reservation lands and had passed into private ownership under patents
from the United States and grants from the State of Washington. 56 The
Court held that the private owners' title was still subject to the Tribe's
right to fish, and that the United States had the power to enforce a
reserved easement on behalf of the Tribe in order to further57a public purpose-the effectuation of a treaty with the Yakima Indians.
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy
was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians,
upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of
impediment, and which were not much less necessary
to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere
they breathed.... In other words, the treaty was not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them -a reservation of those not granted.58
A right to the use of water is, of course, a property right. Having
confirmed the federal power to reserve rights from state control the Court
applied this doctrine to the field of water rights in Winters v. United
States.59 Winters involved rights to the use of water in the Milk River in
Montana. A 1888 agreement with the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes
had resulted in the creation of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. The
Court found that "[tihe lands were arid and, without irrigation, were
practically valueless." 60 While the agreement reserving the lands made no
52. Id.

53. Id.
at 577.
54. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation

Co., 174 U.S. 690,702 (1899); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 381.
Id. (emphasis added).
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Id. at 576.
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specific mention of water, neither reserving nor ceding it, the Court reasoned that since it was the policy of the Government to change the Indians
into "a pastoral and civilized people" 61 the agreement implied a reservation of water in order to carry out that policy.6 The appellants argued that
even if the agreement had reserved water for the Tribes in 1888, such a reservation was repealed by the admission of Montana into the Union in 1889
"upon an equal footing with the original States." 63 The Court rejected this
argument, stating: "The power of the government to reserve the waters
and exempt them from appropriation under state laws is not denied, and
could not be." 6 4 The Court held that the Tribes' water right had been
reserved at the creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation, and thus had a
priority date of 1888.65 This right was senior to that of nonIndian irrigators
upstream from the Reservation.
Cases in the 80 years since Winters have refined the doctrine of
reserve water rights first articulated in that case. The outlines of this doctrine were clearly drawn by the Court in Cappaertv. United States.66 In that
case the Court held that the creation of Devil's Hole National Monument
in Nevada reserved a water right sufficient to protect a pool containing a
unique species of desert pupfish. In reaching that decision the Court gave
a thorough overview of the federal power to reserve water rights, and the
sources of that power:
This court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain
and reserves it for a federal purpose, the government,
by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States
acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water
which vests on the date of the reserVation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation
of water rights is empowered by the Commerce
Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal regulation of
navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. W, §
3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands.
The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 577 (construing Enabling Act of Feb. 22,1889,50th Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 180,25 Stat.
676 (1889)(admitting North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to the Union)).

64. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)). This argument-that admission to the Union upon an "equal footing" with the other states negates the
reservation of water for federal purposes-has been consistently rejected by the courts. See
Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 92; United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,698 (1978); Arizona v.

San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S, 545,564 (1983).
65. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
66. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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federal enclaves, encompassing 7water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams.
These general principles apply to all federally reserved water
rights-Indian and nonIndian alike.
While Winters stands for the power of the United States to reserve
a water right for federal purposes, it provides no guidance for quantifying
that right. Not until 1963, in Arizona v. California,6 8 was a method for the
quantification of a federally reserved water right judicially adopted. Arizona involved the apportionment of water in the Lower Colorado River
Basin between the United States, five Indian reservations, and five states.
The United States Supreme Court adopted a special master's use of the
"practicably irrigable acreage" (PIA) on the Indian reservations as the
69
applicable standard for quantifying the rights awarded to the Tribes.
While the PIA standard has been criticized 0 it is still the accepted standard for calculating the quantity of water awarded to Indian reservations
71
for agricultural purposes.
However, determining the "purpose" for which a reservation,
Indian or nonIndian, has been set aside can become a struggle in itself.
The leading case in this area is United States v. New Mexico,"L where the
Court held that water is reserved for the prinary purpose for which the
reservation is created, but not for any "secondary" uses of the reservation. 73 New Mexico dealt with the adjudication of the waters of the Rio
Mimbres in southwestern New Mexico. In awarding water for the Gila
National Forest, the Court relied on the Organic Administration Act of
189774 to conclude that the only purposes recognized for the national forest at the time of its creation were timber production and watershed protection. 75 Any other uses of the forest, the Court held, were "secondary"
and did not reserve a federal water right. 76 Thus, water for any of these
67. Id. at 138.
68. 373 U.S. 546 (1963),
69. Id. at 600.
70. See M. Franks, The Uses of the PracticablyIrrigableAcreage Standard in the Quantification
of Reserved Water Rights, 31 Nat. Res. J. (1991); and L. Boomgaarden, Note, PracticablyIrrigable
Acreage Under Fire: The Searchfor a Better Legal Standard,25 Land & Water L. Rev. 417 (1990).
71. Though perhaps not for long ....The U.S. Supreme Court barely approved its use in
Big Horn I with a 4-4 affirmance in Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 496 (1989). Justice
O'Connor did not participate, and the Court did not write an opinion.
72. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
73. Id. at 695.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 473 et seq. (1988).
75. The Court held that the enactment of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16
U.S.C. §528 et seq. (1988)-which enumerated a range of uses beyond timber production and
watershed protection for which the national forests were to be managed-was not merely a
codification of already existing purposes, but created new purposes. The Act, therefore, did
not affect the dual purposes for which the national forests had been created, and thus did not
reserve water for those additional purposes. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713.
76. Id. at 702.
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secondary uses-such as livestock, wildlife, fish, 77
aesthetics, et cetera-had
to be acquired by appropriation under state law.
The basis for the New Mexico Court's narrow interpretation of a
nonIndian reserved right can be traced to Cappaert, where the Court
emphasized that Congress reserved "only that amount of water necessary
to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more."78 The Court's rationale
for this restrictive standard seems
to be a finding of general Congressional
79
deference to state water law.
It is useful to remember, however, that the "minimal need" standards of Cappaert and New Mexico both involved water for nonIndian federal reserves. "The purposes for which the federal government reserves
land are strictly construed. The purposes of Indian reserved rights, on the
other hand, are given broader interpretation to further the federal goal of
Indian self-sufficiency." 80 Also, the deference to state law presumed in
New Mexico and Cappaert would not apply to Indian reservations, which
are generally presumed to be beyond the reach of state laws.81 It is therefore not clear what standard the Court would apply to determine the
quantity of water reserved for an Indian reservation if anything
other than
82
a PIA-based agricultural purpose were found to exist.
V. STATE JURISDICTION VIA McCARRAN
River basins are complex and intradependent systems. A thorough adjudication of the rights to use water from a given stream, therefore, must determine the right of each user in relation to the rights of all
77. Most of these uses, however, would involve leaving water in the stream. Rights for
such uses could not be established under New Mexico state law because there would have
been no "diversion." See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443,493 P.2d 409 (1972).
78. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,.141 (1976).
79. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702, 716-17.
80. State of Montana, ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d
754, 767-68 (Mont. 1985)(citations omitted). Greely draws the distinction between federally
reserved water rights and Indian reserved water rights. "Federal reserved water rights are
created by the document that reserves the land from the public domain. By contrast, aboriginal-Indian reserved water rights exist from time immemorial and are merely recognized by
the document that reserves the Indian land. Federal reserved water rights ... carnot predate
the document that reserved the federal land from the public domain." Id. at 767. Although
the Shoshones, because of their historical use of the Wind River Valley, might have at least a
colorable claim to water rights that predate the 1868 Treaty, there is no contention in the current litigation that any rights predate 1868.
81. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,53 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). See also P. Rogers, Note, In Re Rights To Use Water In Big Horn River, 30 Nat.
Res. J. 439,449, n. 64 (1990); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
82. For example, if a more general "homeland" purpose were found by the court to
include an implied reservation for fish propagation, how much water does that reserve? Such
a reserved right for fish propagation could hypothetically include up to 100 percent of historic natural flow.
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other users on the stream. Power to regulate-and hence adjudicate-the
flowing surface waters of the West has traditionally been left to the states.
The Wyoming Constitution, however, declares that the state disclaims ang
s3
title to, or jurisdiction over, all federal and Indian lands within the state.
The constitutions and Enabling Acts under which most of the Western
states were admitted to the Union contain nearly identical disclaimers as a
condition of being granted statehood.84 The result of these disclaimers
was to place federally reserved water rights at least arguably beyond the
reach of any state court jurisdiction. This created an obvious obstacle to
the meaningful adjudication of water rights on any stream system where
the United States held a reserved right. Without state power to join the
United States as a defendant in system-wide stream adjudications, the
federal right would remain an unknown quantity-a wild card that could
threaten the reliability of an otherwise "settled" allocation of rights.
In response to this perceived problem, Congress passed the
McCarran Amendment in 1953.85 Senator McCarran described the purpose of the Amendment:
S. 18 is not intended.., to be used for any other purpose than to allow the United States to be joined
wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of
various owners on a given stream. This is so because
unless all of the parties owning or in the process of
acquiring water rights on a particular stream can be
joined as parties defendant,
any subsequent decree
86
would be of little value.
The McCarran Amendment is a waiver of federal sovereign
immunity for the limited purpose of stream system adjudications in state
courts.8 7 The extent of the jurisdiction conferred by the Amendment has
been challenged by the United States on several occasions. Each time, the
jurisdiction of the state court has been upheld.

83. Wyo. Const., art XXL §26.
84. See Enabling Act of Feb. 22,1889, supra note 63, at § 4 (admitting North Dakota, South
Dakota, Montana, and Washington); Enabling Act of July 16, 1894,53rd Cong., Sess. II, Ch.
108, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894)(admitting Utah); Enabling Act of June 16,1906, 59th Cong.,

Sess. I, Ch. 3335, § 3,34 Stat. 267,270 (1906)(admitting Oklahoma); Enabling Act of June 20,
1910, 61st Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 310, §§ 2, 20, 36 Stat. 557, 558-559, 569 (1910)(admitting New
Mexico and Arizona); Enabling Act of July 7,1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958),
as amended by Act of June 25, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-70, § 2(a), 73 Stat. 141 (1959)(admitting
Alaska). See also Ariz. Const., art. XX, § 4; Idaho Const,, art. XXI, § 19; Mont. Const., Ordinance No. 1; N.M. Const., art. XXI, § 2; Utah Const., art. Ill.
85. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
86. S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1952)(quoted in United States v. District Court
For Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520,525 (1971)).
87. See supra note 5 for the relevant text of the McCarran Amendment.
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In United States v. District Courtfor Eagle County,88 the Supreme
Court rejected the United States' claim that only those federal rights
acquired by appropriation under state (in this case, Colorado) law were
subject to state adjudication under the McCarran Amendment. The
Amendment was thus held to apply to federal reserve rights as well as
those acquired pursuant to state law.89 More pertinent to the Big Horn
cases was the decision in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe.90 That case
dealt with the disclaimers of state jurisdiction contained in the Arizona
Enabling Act and Constitution. The Court stated clearly: "[W]e are convinced that, whatever limitation the Enabling Acts or federal policy may
have originally placed on state-court jurisdiction over Indian water rights,
those limitations were removed by the McCarran Amendment." 91 The
Court also held that, to the extent that any bar to state court jurisdiction is
premised on a state constitution, that is a question of state law over which
state courts have final authority. Thus, when a state court elects to take
jurisdiction in the face of such a disclaimer, the federal courts must
assume that jurisdiction exists. 92 The rationales of San CarlosApache were
central to the Wyoming courts' assumption of jurisdiction in the Big Horn
cases.

93

VI. LIMITATIONS ON STATE JURISDICTION
It may appear at first that the question of using a PIA-based
reserved right for instream flow, and the question of the proper authority
to administer the 1985 Big Horn Decree, are separate and discreet issues.
In this case, however, the two issues are inextricably bound together. The
state engineer premised his refusal to shut down junior appropriators to
protect the Tribes' reserved right on his view that the use to which the
Tribes were goif to put that water-instream flow-was illegal and thus
unenforceable.9 It was this failure of the state engineer to enforce the
Tribes' right that prompted Judge Hartman to replace him with the Tribal
Water Resources Control Board as the agency assigned to administer both
Indian and nonlndian water rights within the boundaries of the Wind
River Indian Reservation. 95 Both issues-at least as decided by the district
88. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).

89. Id.at 524.
90. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
91. Id. at 564. For a discussion of this issue, see W. Schwartz, Comment, State Disclaimersof

JurisdictionOver Indians: A Bar To The McCarran Amendment?, 18 Land & Water L. Rev. 175
(1983)(concluding that such a bar to jurisdiction would run counter to federal Indian policy,
and was thus not the intended purpose of the state disclaimers).
92. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 561.
93. Big Horn 1,753 P.2d at 87-88.
94. Brief for State, supranote 13, at 5. See also Brief for Tribes, supranote 13, at 7.
95. March 1991 Decree, supra note 20, at 14.
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court on March 11, 1991-involve a limitation on state jurisdiction and
authority. The more straightforward of these two issues is the use of the
Tribes' reserved water right for instream flow.
A. Use of PIA-based Reserved Right for Instream Flow
The Tribes may change their reserved water right to
instream
flow without regard to Wyoming state water
96
law.
The 1985 Decree does not specifically provide that the Tribes may
use their award for instream flow.97 Nor does the 1988 Big Horn I decision.
Still, there is ample authority for the proposition that the method used to
quantify a reserved right does not restrict the actual use of that water once
awarded.
Any claimed restriction on the use to which a federally reserved
water right may be put, at least within the geographic boundaries of the
Reservation9 8 , is necessarily a construct of state, not federal law. Federal
law does not place any restriction on the use of such a water right. In a
1979 supplemental decree issued pursuant to its 1963 Arizona v. California99 decision-the case in which the PIA standard was first articulatedthe United States Supreme Court stated that "reference to a [PIA-based]
quantity of water necessary to supply consumptive use required for irrigation.., shall constitute the means of determining the quantity of adjudicated water rights but shall not constitute a restriction
on the usage of
10 0
them to irrigation or other agricultural application."

96. March 1991 Decree, supra note 20, at 18.
97. During the district court's adjudication of Tribal water rights in Big Horn I, Judge Joffe
denied the Tribes' claim to additional quantities reserved for the purpose of "fishery flows."
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, May 10, 1983, In Re Rights To Use Of
Water In Big Horn River, Fifth District Court of Wyoming, at 19, 60, 63 and 69 [hereinafter
1983 Decision]. While relying solely on PIA to quantify the Tribes' reserved right, Judge Joffe
was careful to point out that such a ruling did not restrict the use of that water to agriculture:
"If the Tribes desire to use so much of their water for other purposes, they may do so." Id. at
20. Later, after the district court case had been taken over by Judge Johnson, he too denied a
request by the Tribes for an additional water right reserved for instream flow. As had Judge
Joffe, Judge Johnson made it clear that such a denial should not be construed as restricting
the Tribes in the use of their reserved water right. Judge Johnson, however, went still further
to specifically state that "[t]he Tribes may seek to dedicate their stream flows for fish habitat
by using flows reserved to them by the decision." Order Ruling on Motions to Alter or
Amend the Decision of May 10, 1983, June 8,1984, In Re Rights To Use Of Water In Big Horn
River, Fifth District Court of Wyoming, at 36. In Big Horn III, the Tribes contend that these
decisions were incorporated as part of the 1985 Amended Decree and have thus become the
law of the case. Tribes' Brief at 15.
98. See supra note 16 for the rationale behind this geographic limitation.
99. 373 U.S 564 (1963).
100. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1979)(emphasis added). See also D.
Getches, Water Law 305 (1984).
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In Big Horn I the Wyoming Supreme Court only hinted that the
Tribes might legally chane the use of their reserved water right from irrigation to some other use. 01 The Court did, however, make it abundantly
clear that it is federal law which governs a reserved water right.
The decree entered in the instant case does not require
application of state water law to the Indian reservation. The decree recognizes reserved water rights
based on federal law. The role of the state engineer is
thus not to apply state law, but to enforce the reserved
102
rights as decreed under principle of federal law.
Since federal law places no restrictions on the on-reservation use
of a reserved water right, it seems apparent that the Tribes may dedicate
any portion of that right to instream flow. Still, the more difficult question
remains: Is it indeed the state engineer who should enforce the reserved
rights on the Wind River Reservation?
B. Who Should Administer... ?
The Wind River Reservation is home to both Indians and nonIndians. There are fee lands, allotment lands and trust lands on the Reservation. There are reserved water rights and state water rights. The choice
between the state engineer and the Tribal Water Resources Control Board
to administer water rights on the Reservation is really a choice between
two generally disfavored situations. Either the state will be allowed to regulate activity on an Indian reservation, or the Tribes will be given civil
jurisdiction over nonlndians. This choice actually concerns only the regulation of the middle ground: holders of state water rights on fee lands. No
one claims that the Tribes should have any jurisdiction over activities outside the Reservation. Conversely, it is equally settled that the state engineer has no enforcement
powers against the Tribes, nor jurisdiction over
10 3
their water rights.
1. The Case Iaw
The assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations
may be preempted by federal law, or it may be barred for unlawfully
infringing on the right of reservation Indians to self-government. 104 The
101. In discussing the amount of water reserved for historically irrigated lands on the
Wind River Indian Reservation, the Court wrote: "The award does not interfere with the
Tribes' right to administer their own affairs; it merely quantifies the reserved right for historic
lands by awarding only the amount of water necessary to irrigate all the PIA." Big Horn 1,753
P.2d at 111.
102. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
103. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 115.
104. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,448 U.S. 136,142-43 (1980).
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United States Supreme Court has recognized that the unique origins of
tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply those standards of
federal preemption have that emerged in other areas of the law.10 5 In 1980,
in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.Bracker, the Court sketched the rough
outlines of a balancing test for evaluating competing claims of regulatory
jurisdiction that was gradually refined over the course of the ensuing
decade. The Court called for "a particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake" to determine whether, in
any specific case, the
exercise of state authority on a reservation would
10 6
violate federal law.
The following year, in Montana v. United States,10 7 the Court held
that the Crow Tribe of Montana lacked jurisdiction to regulate nonIndian
hunting and fishing on nonIndian lands within the reservation. Reasoning
that the dependent status of Indian tribes has implicitly divested them of
full sovereignty over relations between the tribes and nonmembers, 108 the
Court did, however, note some specific and very important exceptions to
this general divestiture of sovereignty:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over
nonIndians on their reservations, even on nonindian
fee lands.... A tribe may... retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of nonIlndians
on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic
security, or the health or wel1°9
fare of the tribe.
Two subsequent cases addressed the question of regulatory jurisdiction in the context of water rights. In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton110 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the State of Washington could
regulate the use of water by a nonIndian farmer on fee land within the
Colville Reservation. Walton was diverting water from No Name Creek, a
stream arising and ending entirely within the boundaries of the reservation. The court relied on the "health or welfare" exception delineated in
Montana in holding that "[eispecially in arid and semi-arid regions of the
West, water is the lifeblood of the community. Its regulation is an important [tribal] sovereign power."" 1 The court noted, however, that the fact
that the No Name stream system is contained entirely within the reserva105.
106.
107.
108.
109,
110.

Id.
at 143.
Id. at 145.
450 U.S. 544 (1980), reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 911 (1981).
450 U.S. at 564.
Id. at 565-66.
647 F2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).

111. Id. at 52.
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tion made the decision easier than it might otherwise be. 112 Indeed, it was
this geographic peculiarity of Walton that allowed the 113
same court to distinguish it three years later in United States v. Anderson.
In Anderson the Ninth Circuit again considered the issue of regulatory authority over water use by nonndians on an Indian reservation.
This time, however, the court found the balance of interests to be tipped in
favor of state regulation. The court noted that the stream in question in
Anderson, Chamokane Creek, has both its source and end off the reservation. The stream does not flow through the reservation, as in Walton, but
only forms part of its boundary. The court further noted that the state's
interest in developing a comprehensive water plan for the entire basin
(which extends well beyond the reservation) weighed heavily in favor of
permitting state regulation of non-reserved water rights on the reservation. 114 Also central to the court's decision was the fact that the water
rights in the Chamokane Basin were being administered by a115federal
water master who would protect the rights of the Spokane Tribe.
The United States Supreme Court has most recently addressed the
issue of conflicting regulatory jurisdiction in Brendale v. Confederated
Yakima Nation.116 This case involved a challenge to tribal zoning laws by
nonIndian landowners and by Yakima County. The Court allowed Yakima
County zoning authority over the "open" (largely nonIndian populated)
portion of the reservation, and upheld tribal zoning authority in the
"closed" (almost exclusively Indian populated) portion of the reservation.
The Court, however, could produce no majority opinion on the rationales
supporting these outcomes.
Justice White, writing for a plurality of four, opined that the question of regulatory authority was not a choice between state or tribal sovereignty. He reasoned that tribal sovereignty over nonmembers in the open
area was inconsistent with the Tribe's dependent status.11 7 Thus, the only
question was whether the specific land uses permitted by Yakima County's zoning board themselves threatened some protectable interest of the
Tribe.118 The proper place for the Tribe to begin such a challenge, Justice
112. Id.
113. 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).

114. Id. at 1366.
115. Id.
116. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
117. Justice White found it significant that the second Montana exception (conduct that

"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe," 450 U.S. at 566) "is prefaced by the word 'may'-[a] tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation.' " Brendale at 428-29 (quoting Montana at 566)(emphasis added
by Justice White). Justice White thus reasoned that tribal authority does not necessarily
extend to all conduct contained within the exception, "but instead depends on the circumstances." Brendale at 429. This view seems to dictate that a separate inquiry must precede (or
follow?) the sort of balancing of interests mandated by Bracker.

118. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431.
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White believed, was in the county zoning proceedings-not to challenge
the county's jurisdiction, but to challenge the specific actions permitted
under that jurisdiction. If the county fails to respect the rights of the Tribe
under federal law, the Yakima Nation could then turn to the federal courts
for injunctive relief. 119
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor, delivered an opinion
concurring with the result of Justice White's opinion but concluding that
the power of a tribe to regulate land use is necessarily included within the
power to exclude nonmembers from its reservation. 120 This power to
exclude derives from both the tribe's aboriginal sovereignty and-at least
in the case of the Yakima Nation-from the express provisions of its treaty
with the United States. 121 Under this analysis the question becomes: To
what extent has this inherent power to exclude been either diminished by
statute or voluntarily surrendered? 122 Justice Stevens concluded that in
those portions of the reservation where large tracts of land have been sold
in fee to nonmembers, Congress could not have intended that the Tribe
retain the power to regulate the use of land by nonmember landowners
who have no voice in setting tribal policy. Conversely, the sale of a few lots
in the closed portion of the reservation does not divest the Tribe of its
to determine the character of its tribal community through
inherent power
13
regulation.
Distilled to its essence, Brendale suggests that a tribe's power to
assert regulatory authority over nonmembers will depend to a large
extent on the demographics of the particular land area in question. Where
nonmembers have acquired significant property interests, a tribe's sovereignty is proportionately diminished and may be outweighed by the
state's interest in protecting the rights of those with no influence over the
policies governing such regulation. On the other hand, the extent to which
nonlndian activities on the reservation imperil those tribal interests articulated in Montana will function as the counterbalance in making this
determination.
2. Balancing the Interests
In determining whether the exercise of state regulatory control
over non-reserved water rights on the Wind River Indian Reservation is
preempted by federal law, the Wyoming Supreme Court will not be able to
rely on any hard and fast rule of law. Instead, it will probably have to
wade into the kind of fact-dependent, particularized inquiry suggested by
119. Id.
120. Id. at 433.
121. Id, at 435.

122. Id.at 436-37.
123. Id. at 437.
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Bracker. What follows is a brief look at some of the factors in the Big Horn
Basin that might weigh into such an inquiry.
Though there are no distinct "open" or "closed" areas on the
Wind River Reservation, as there were on the Yakima Reservation in Brendale, there are significant nonIndian landholdings and populations. Determining the relative extent of sovereignty either retained or divested by the
Tribes in various areas of the Reservation would almost certainly require
additional proceedings in the district court. This kind of fact-finding could
become quite difficult. On the one hand, treating the entire Reservation as
a single unit would be most efficient from the standpoint of administering
an integrated system of water rights. On the other hand, in the interest of
fairness to all affected parties, a Brendale-typeinquiry could be carried out
ad absurdumresulting in an unmanageable patchwork of areas determined
to be subject to the respective jurisdictions of the Tribes or the state.
The fact that the jurisdiction at issue involves water raises the
stakes on both sides. As noted by the Walton court, water is critical to the
sustenance and development of tribal communities and thus triggers the
Montana "health or welfare" exception to the implied withdrawal of regulatory power over nonmembers. 24 The weight accorded to this exception will depend on whether the Wyoming Supreme Court accepts the
interpretation of the "may retain inherent power" language espoused by
Justice White's plurality opinion in Brendale.125 If the Court accepts the
White view that tribal jurisdiction is not necessarily mandated by the
implication of tribal health or welfare, then the exception is not dispositive
and a further balancing of all the circumstances is required.
The McCarran Amendment itself is an implicit congressional recognition of the great interest states have in control and regulation of water
resources within their borders. In Anderson the court reasoned that a
state's interest in regulating water use for the benefit of all its citizens is a
concern "shared with, not displaced by, similar tribal and federal interests
when water is located within the boundaries of both the state and the reservation." 126 Such an observation, however, could just as easily be read as
an argument in favor of tribal, rather than state jurisdiction.12 ' The weight
of the state's interest depends, in large part, on the extent to which the
128
water system in question transcends the boundaries of the reservation.
The relationship of the Wind River to the Reservation is neither as
exclusive as that of No Name Creek in Walton, nor as attenuated as that of
Chamokane Creek in Anderson. After rising in the Bridger-Teton National
124. Walton, 647 F.2d at 52.

125. See supranote 117.
126. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1366.
127. As a means of resolving a conflict between two parties, this kind of assertion that no
real conflict exists seems less than satisfactory.
128. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1366.
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Forest west of the Reservation, the Wind River flows southeast then north
for over 100 miles fully within the boundaries of the Reservation, eventually becoming the main stem of the Big Horn River. After leaving the Reservation, however, the Big Horn River continues on for another 100 plus
miles through north central Wyoming before flowing north into Montana.
Thus, the interests of both the state and the Tribes in the Regulation of the
River are substantial.
3. Administration
Incidental monitoring of Indian [water] use... has
carelessly been termed "administration"
of Indian
129
water by the state engineer.
If it is to be effective, the power to administer the interrelated
water rights on a stream system must include the power to enforce those
rights. And ultimately, the power to enforce means the power to close the
headgates of a junior appropriator so that the rights of a senior appropriator can be fully satisfied. In Big Horn 1, any such power over the Tribes
was explicitly denied the state engineer. The court ruled that if the state
engineer finds that the Tribes are in violation of the 1985 Decree, "it is clear
that he must then turn to the courts for enforcement of the decree against
the United States and the Tribes and that he cannot simply close the headgates." 130 This lack of direct administrative power over a large proportion
of the water rights on the Wind River Indian Reservation could make
effective administration by the state engineer cumbersome if not impossible.
There is no parallel obstacle to tribal administration of state water
rights on the Reservation. If the Wyoming Supreme Court,upholds the
district court's March, 1991 Decree, the Tribal Water Resources Control
Board will have power to administer all the water rights on the Wind
River Indian Reservation. The Tribal agency would have enforcement
power against on-reservation holders of state water rights, but would
13 1 If
administer those rights according to state, not federal water law.
sheer practicality and efficiency of administration are considered by the
court, administration by the Tribal agency would have a distinct advan129. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 115.

130. Id.
131. March 1991 Decree, supra note 20, at 18. One commentator advocates a departure

from tribes' strict application of state law to state permitted water rights on Indian reservations. Instead, she proposes a "public interest" standard for tribal administration of Indian
and nonIndian water rights on reservations. "Such a standard would enable tribes either by
code or regulations to weigh, for example, with respect to a transfer of use application-possible injury to junior users, the economic value of the new and existing uses, environmental
and cultural concerns, and other important tribal government interests." S. Williams, Indian
Winters Rights Administration:Averting New War, 11 Pub. Land L. Rev. 53, 79-80 (1990).
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tage over the kind of partial authority that could be granted the State Engineer. Such a practical advantage, coupled with the Tribes' strong
sovereign interest in the regulation of water within the confines of the Reservation, would seem to counsel strongly in favor of Tribal rather than
state administration.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Wyoming's adjudication of the Indian reserved water rights to the
Big Horn River was the first of its kind in the nation. Now that the proceedings have moved beyond adjudication and into questions of administration, the Wind River Reservation will again be a legal testing ground.
Big Horn III will provide an example of one approach to the administration, on an Indian reservation, of Indian and nonindian water rights adjudicated pursuant to a McCarran suit.

POSTSCRIPT
This Comment was written before the Wyoming Supreme Court
in Big Horn III. On June 5, 1992 the court issued that
issued its13decision
2
decision.
The court's disposition of the case can be most charitably
described as confusing. In five separate opinions the five Justices spin out
a variety of rationales for their respective positions. Two different majorities hold that 1) the Tribes may not use for instream flow water rights that
were awarded based on the PIA of future projects, and 2) the district court
erred in replacing the state engineer with the Tribal water agency as the
administrator of water rights on the Wind River Indian Reservation. The
opinion of the court, written by Justice Macy, manages to misinterpret or
ignore a significant body of authority, including much of the court's own
opinion in Big Horn I, in asserting that the purpose for which the Tribes'
water rights were reserved limits the use of those rights. Thus, the Tribes
may use their PIA-based future project water rights "solely for agricultural and subsumed purposes and not for instream purposes." On the
subject of administration, Macy seems to reason that Indian water rights
are subject to the authority of the state engineer because the federally
133
reserved water is actually "Wyoming water" owned by the state.
At the end of a lengthy and often scathing dissent, Justice Golden
concludes:
132. It is published at 835 P. 2d 273.
133, See id., at 283.
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"If one may mark the turn of the 20th century by the
massive expropriation of Indian lands, then the turn of
the 21st century is the era when the Indian tribes risk
the same fate for their water resources." Joseph R.
Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalismand
the Trust Responsibility, 27 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 14
(1992).
Today some members of the court sound a warning to
the Tribes that they are determined to complete the
agenda initiated over 100 years ago and are willing to
pervert prior decisions to advance that aim. I cannot be
a party to deliberate and transparent efforts to eliminate the political and economic base of the Indian peodistorted guise of state water law
ples under13the
4
superiority.
On June 30,1992, the Wyoming Supreme Court denied the Tribes'
petition for rehearing.
ERIC HANNUM

134. 835 E2d 273,303-04.

